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Abstract 
Governance plays a crucial role in most activities of socio-economic life. For any organizations, units, businesses 
or higher, a country, a community, the role of governance becomes more important than ever. For businesses, with 
globalization taking place and market becoming more competitive than ever, good Corporate Governance is now 
considered as a factor of success. Good corporate governance will help the company improve its ability to access 
to various sources of capital and operate more efficiently. However, in Vietnam particularly, Corporate Governance 
system still need to enhance and improve. Therefore, with the aim of surveying the current situation of Corporate 
Governance practices in Vietnam and giving the analysis of its impacts on businesses’ performance, this research 
is conducted from a sample of 60 listed-companies in both Construction and Food & Beverage industry for the 
time 2015, 2017 and 2018. By using the tool of ASEAN balanced scorecard to evaluate Vietnam Corporate 
Governance practices on 05 aspects: Rights of shareholders, Equitable treatment of shareholders, Roles of 
stakeholders, Disclosure and transparency and Board duties and responsibilities, the paper came to the low results 
of companies’ Corporate Governance practices in Vietnam. Based on this method, different relationships were 
found, one of which is the positive relationship between Corporate Governance Index and Tobin’s Q. 
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1. Introduction 
Since people began to form groups to accomplish goals that could not achieve individually, governance has become 
essential to ensure coordination between different individuals. Alongside with the fast growth of businesses in both 
amount and scale today, particularly within the listed firm in Vietnam, Corporate Governance – a tool to help 
separate proprietorship and management, is increasingly drawing attention of numerous organizations and 
lawmakers on businesses. 
Generally, governance is the process of laying the foundations of basic operational principles for an enterprise. 
The topic of Corporate Governance is conceived from the matter of partition between management and 
shareholders of companies. Whether a company is a public company or a private one, Corporate Governance is 
always meant to protect stakeholders’ rights and people related. In the case of public companies, there are a lot of 
small shareholders whose voices seem to be restricted, thus there should exist a transparent system to protect their 
rights. Moreover, as investors depend on public sources of information to have an understanding of the company, 
they need to make sure of the quality, accuracy and clarity of financial information. Thereby, transparency in 
Corporate Governance system is necessarily required. This transparency will increase investors’ confidence in 
making investment decisions. As a result, businesses can attract more capital, particularly from foreign investors. 
Overall, Corporate Governance give companies directions to create value for both shareholders and society in a 
competitive market.  
In Vietnam particularly, the Corporate Governance is now taken more seriously by businesses but it is yet in 
a strong position. In ASEAN disclosure index 2018 conducted by FTI Consulting Group on top 180 listed 
companies ranking on disclosure quality, Vietnam ranked last in all three categories: composite disclosure, board 
quality and risk disclosure. Meanwhile on State enterprises, according to the Ministry of Planning and Investment, 
in 2017, only 265/622 enterprises (accounting for 42.6% of the State enterprises) sent reports to the Ministry to 
publish information on Business Portal and in 2016, this rate was only 38.9% (D, A 2018).   
With globalization taking place and market becoming more competitive than ever, the importance of good 
Corporate Governance is seriously considered and its impact on firm’s performance are unavoidable and 
undeniable. It might be the reason that many studies have been done to analyze this relationship.  
Hence, this paper will contribute to the topic of the connection between Corporate Governance Index and 
firm performance. Particularly, with the use of ASEAN scorecard method, the score for each category in Corporate 
Governance will be calculated based on disclosed information of companies in public. After that, the relationship 
between Corporate Governance score and firm performance is tested and discussed. In order to conduct the paper, 
a sample of 60 non-financial companies in Food & Beverage & Construction industry listed on Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchange (HOSE) and Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) for three years (2015, 2017 and 2018) is chosen. Year 2016 
is omitted, as we want to observe the changing progress more clearly. 
In details, this paper covers the following four purposes: Providing basic information about Vietnam 
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Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance Index as well as the use of ASEAN scorecard; Identifying the score 
for each categories in Corporate Governance mechanism of 60 listed companies in Vietnam for three years (2015, 
2017 and 2018) by using ASEAN scorecard; Discussing the relationship between Corporate Governance score 
calculated based on ASEAN scorecard and firm performance measured through market-based valuation and 
accounting-based valuation and Provide discussing the reasons for the Vietnam Corporate Governance scores and 
recommendation for improvement. 
This paper is divided into 5 sessions. Session 1 introduces the topic of the paper. Next, session 2 provides 
information on the literature review of theoretical literature and empirical studies that have been done in previous 
work. Followed by is session 3, which includes the methodology of the research, and session 4 is given for results. 
Finally yet importantly, session 5 concludes on the discussion of findings of the paper as well as some limitation 
when conducting the research and recommendation for improving. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Corporate Governance in Asia 
According to the book Corporate Governance in Development (2003), which was published by OECD 
Development Centre, the matter of Corporate Governance had never been considered adequately in developing 
countries. It remained practically imperceptible in those nations until the East Asia financial crisis of 1997-1998. 
Mentioned in the study of Corporate Governance in Southeast Asia by Philippines Institution for Development 
Studies, the downturn of economy revealed latent problems (e.g. corruption), exacerbated others (e.g. poor 
resource management) and gave rise to new ones (e.g. political instability) (Eduardo & Magdalena 2009). Also in 
major Southeast Asia countries such as Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, the factors of poor 
investment structure, weak legal and accounting system, faulty financial practices, questionable political 
interventions had been described as substantial contributors to the decline of economic during the crisis stage (Ho 
2005). Such pressure has provoked the desire of implementing new policies to strengthen the condition of 
Corporate Governance, recover economy and prevent external shocks from transforming into major crisis. Those 
policies included transparency, institutional accountability and fiscal prudence (Ho 2005). Moreover, the corporate 
restructuring was not restricted to these countries affected only but also adopted by those nations that were not 
influenced by the crisis, such as China, Taiwan and Singapore since they believed that prevention is better than 
cure. Vietnam is not an exception in this turning point of reforming.  
However, not until 2005 when Vietnam Enterprise Law was published that it led to a significant improvement 
in Corporate Governance in general and in shareholding companies in particular (Nguyen 2008). In term of legal 
status, the advent of the stock market and the issuance of Decision 12/2007/QD-BTC on Corporate Governance 
Regulations applied to companies listed on the Stock Exchange have shown the initial attention of Vietnam to 
listed companies’ Corporate Governance. Since then, Vietnam has continuously improved the legal framework on 
Corporate Governance by issuing Circular 52/2012/TT-BTC about information disclosure on the stock market, 
Circular No.121/2012/TT-BTC on Corporate Governance Regulations applicable to public companies or Decree 
No.108/2013/ND-CP about sanctions executed for administrative violations in the field of securities and securities 
market. The introduction of these documents has helped improve Corporate Governance compliance and 
enforcement of public companies in Vietnam. Moreover, these actions are also seen as the determination of 
Vietnam in improving the legal framework for Corporate Governance operations with the aim to shorten the 
distance with the world.   
In 2008, the World Bank made a comparative study of Corporate Governance in different countries such as 
Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia, for the periods 2003-2006, the author summarized and made the 
comparison between four countries based on scores observed in each category. Generally, there were total of 22 
categories and the maximum score attainable was 110. As a result, Vietnam achieved lowest overall score (50.9) 
and ranked below Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia whose scores were 77.3, 72.7 and 60 respectively. In details, 
it is seen that over 22 categories, Vietnam ranked at the last position in 19 categories, which included Basic 
shareholder rights, shareholders’ annual general meeting rights, equal treatment of shareholders, prohibition of 
insider trading, disclosure of interests, etc., to name a few. Especially with such categories like Objective judgment 
exercise, The board responsibility, Law compliance, Fair treatment to shareholders, Fair and timely dissemination, 
Disclosure standards, Disclosure of Interests, Insider trading prohibition, Equal treatment of shareholders, it was 
hardly observed from Vietnamese companies’ Corporate Governance mechanism. The outcomes evidently shown 
a fact that the corporate governance system in Vietnam was still lacking and unclear compared to other countries 
in region.  
A report published by ASEAN Capital Markets Forum also indicated the inferior status of Vietnam Corporate 
Governance compared to another five ASEAN country members including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. Although the point for Vietnam Corporate Governance practices got better and better 
during the period 2011-2015 (from 28.4 points in 2011 to 36.75 points in 2015), Vietnamese listed companies still 
had the lowest average management score among the six ASEAN member countries surveyed, reflecting the 
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limited Corporate Governance activities in Vietnam's listed companies. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance and firm performance in Asia 
The situation of globalization worldwide has exacerbated competition within the country and even across national 
boundaries, followed by a controversy around the world that whether better-governed firms outperform the others 
(Akshita & Shernaz 2018). This is undoubtedly an urge for researchers to start the discovery into the influences of 
Corporate Governance system on corporations’ performance. 
In the research published by Shafie, Kamilah & Khaw (2016) took into consideration the relationship between 
Corporate Governance Practices and Firm Performance with the evidence from Top 100 Public Listed Companies 
in Malaysia. The researchers used Board size and Board Independence as two indicators to test the hypothesized 
relationship between the Corporate Governance and firm performance. Wen-Yen & Pong Pitch presented another 
paper studying about The Corporate Governance on the Efficiency Performance of Thai non-life insurance industry 
in 2010. The research discovered the negative impact of audit committee size, diligence, voting rights, board tenure, 
board age and board ownership on firm performance whose measures were based on firm’s technical, allocative, 
cost, and revenue efficiency. 
In Vietnam, the structure of Corporate Governance has just been in a beginning period of development. 
However, there are gradually lot of researchers paying attention to this matter and start to conduct analysis 
exploiting the better Firm Performance by developing Corporate Governance. One of some outstanding papers is 
“The impact of Corporate Governance on firm performance: Empirical Study in Vietnam” conducted by Vo & 
Nguyen (2014). By taking the dataset of 177 listed companies in Vietnam for the time period from 2008 to 2012, 
the authors found some noticeable results which were the positive correlation between duality role of the CEO and 
firm performance, the opposite effects of board independence on firm performance and the structural change 
between the organizational ownership and firm performance.  
With the approach of taking a sample of 30 listed companies from VN30 Index, Dao (2018) analyzed the 
dataset and got the findings of positive correlation between number of Director Board, independent CEO and 
Major Shareholders and performance of Vietnamese non-manufacturing firms. Also conducted by Dao & Hoang 
(2012) but focused on banking industry only, the research of Corporate Governance and Performance in 
Vietnamese Commercial Banks concluded the huge influence of the Director Board member’s number and ratio 
of capital adequacy on the bank’s performance. The findings can be utilized usefully and be great assistance in 
helping organizations minimize business risks. Pham (2016) can examine the impact of Corporate Governance on 
firm performance measured as ROA and Tobin’s Q. However, in case of Tobin’s Q, there was no significant 
correlation between ownership of managers and firm performance. 
Manmeet and Madhu (2018) constructed a CGI to examine the good governance practices of Indian banks 
and to see whether the banks had great performance accordingly. The outcome demonstrated that CGI is 
significantly and positively in correlation with banks’ financial performance measures, which are, return on assets, 
economic value added and Tobin’s Q. Also conducting the research in India context but on business firms, Akshita 
and Shernaz (2018) used essential parameters of Corporate Governance such as ownership structure and board 
structure to build CGI to discover the relationship between Corporate Governance Index and firm performance. 
As a result, the firm performance metrics (Returns on assets, earning per share and return on net worth) are proved 
to have significant positive relationship with CGI. With these empirical evidence, firms may have good incentives 
to deliberately improve their Corporate Governance as it helps to enhance their performance. Additionally, the 
investors would likewise have positive view on business firms keeping up high governance standards, therefore 
lessening possible funding costs. 
Another study needed to mention is the research conducted in 2007 by Langfen et al. By taking the sample 
of firms listed in Taiwan, they constructed a CGI based on four different dimensions of a firm’s Corporate 
Governance structure: CEO duality, size of the board of directors, managements’ holdings and block shareholders’ 
holding to clarify the connection between ownership/leadership structures and stock returns of these firms.  
In Vietnam, to my best knowledge, there have not been many researchers studying the association between 
the firm performance and CGI. In 2018, Dao & Nguyen published their study of “The impact of Corporate 
Governance Index on the performance of listed companies VN30 Index”. The index questions are based on 
Thailand Corporate Governance Report (2012) and OECD principals. The result shows that Corporate Governance 
Index has significant effect on the firm performance of company, which is measured by ROA.  
There have not had many researches that using ASEAN scorecard to measure the standards of listed 
companies’ corporate governance in Vietnam or the study about relationship between ASEAN governance 
scorecard and firm performance. The only source that using the ASEAN scorecard to giving an overview of 
Vietnamese Corporate Governance is the ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard Country Reports and 
Assessments done by the cooperation of ASEAN Markets Forum & The ASEAN Development Bank from 2012 
to 2015. Besides the assessment of publicly listed companies in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand, Vietnam is also included in the group for evaluation. By giving score to 2 levels of scoring, which covers 
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areas of OECD principals (rights of shareholders, equitable treatments of shareholders, role of stakeholders, 
disclosure and transparency and responsibility of the board), among 50 Vietnamese listed companies participating 
in the evaluation Petro Viet Nam Fertilizer and Chemicals, Ho Chi Minh City Securities and Viet Nam Dairy 
Products Joint Stock were the top three companies having highest ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard total 
score in 2015.  
 
3. Methodology 
The research is designed to evaluate Corporate Governance mechanism of 60 listed companies in two industries 
in Vietnam at time 2015, 2017 and 2018 by using the ASEAN balanced scorecard and their relationship with firm 
performance. There will be 180 observations in total. 
 
3.1 Sample selection 
Sample size of 60 non-financial companies, in which 30 listed companies are in Food & Beverage & Consumer 
Goods Industry, another 30-listed company belong to Construction and Real Estate Industry in HOSE and HNX 
Stock Exchange are chosen to undertake the Corporate Governance assessment using ASEAN scorecard method. 
These are the two biggest industries in Vietnam market with market capitalization estimated to be 861,459.38 and 
577,288.97 billion Vietnam dong respectively (Financial Industry is excluded). Additionally, the information 
needed for evaluation is taken from three years, which are 2015, 2017 and 2018 so that it will be easier to track 
the improvement of each company’s Corporate Governance practices over the time. Hence, there will be 180 
observations in total. 
 
3.2 ASEAN scorecard for Vietnam Corporate Governance 
According to the report prepared by a group of Association of Southeast Asian Nations Corporate Governance 
Experts (2016), The ASEAN corporate governance scorecard is a great supporting tool to measure ASEAN 
corporate governance, which is endorsed by the ASEAN Capital Markets Forum (ACMF). 
The ASEAN scorecard was developed based on international benchmarks and framework of the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), the 
International Corporate Governance Network Corporate Governance Principles and industry-leading practices 
from ASEAN & the world. The objective of developing publicly listed companies’ governance standards is to give 
Southeast Asia Nations a greater universal perceptibility towards well-governed listed companies and encourage 
them to improve their practices to reach their global counterparts’ level. Moreover, it also complements other 
ASEAN Markets Forum initiatives and promotes ASEAN as an asset class (ACMF 2017).  
There are two levels of scoring designed for ASEAN scorecard assessment. The calculation based on two 
scoring dimensions is likely to reflect the actual execution of the substance of good Corporate Governance better. 
According to ACMF country report (2015), Level 1 contains descriptors or components that are, 
fundamentally, characteristics of the laws, regulations, rules and basic expectation of OECD principles. In details, 
in this level, there are five areas of OECD principle that the scorecard covers:  
Part A: Rights of Shareholders 
Part B: Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
Part C: Role of Stakeholders 
Part D: Disclosure and Transparency 
Part E: Responsibilities of the Board 
It is essential to note that the attributes included in two levels are not necessarily legally required but those 
constructed ones are considered as the good components contributing to great Corporate Governance mechanism 
by international standards.  
The ASEAN scorecard, further understanding as CGI, is not survey-based. Thus, it means that the questions 
are answered from available information, which is already revealed by listed companies. In other words, the 
method used keeps assessors away from conceivably emotional or subjective answers. The sources of information 
needed to accomplish the questions in two levels are normally gotten from annual reports, company’s charter & 
regulation and annual general meeting documents. It is easy to get access to those documents through company 
website or stock exchange information website such as finance.vietstock.vn, cafeF.vn – the two useful sources of 
website for listed firms in Vietnam.   
There are about 183 questions in ASEAN scorecard, which are divided into 02 level. Each question 
corresponds to a “Yes” or “No” answer. The maximum value for each question is one and the minimum value is 
0. If answer to the question is “Yes”, then the score of question is 1 point. In other hands, if answer to the question 
is “No”, then the value of 0 is attributed to that question.  
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Table 1. Weight and maximum score assigned for each part in level 1 
Level 1 
Number of 
Questions 
Weight (as a % of total 
Level 1 score) 
Maximum Attainable 
Score (points) 
Part A: Rights of Shareholders 21 10 10 
Part B: Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 15 15 15 
Part C: Role of Stakeholders 13 10 10 
Part D: Disclosure and Transparency 32 25 25 
Part E: Responsibilities of the Board 65 40 40 
Level 1 comprises of 146 components, which are separated into five sections relating to the OECD standards. 
A reasonable weight, which is in relation to the total Level 1 score of 100 points, is assigned to each part depending 
on the relative significance of the category.  
Table 2. Maximum score assigned for each part in level 2 
Level 2 Number of Questions 
Maximum Attainable Score 
(points) 
Bonus 12 10 
Penalty 25 10 
Level 2 includes bonus and penalty elements, which is designed with the intention of improving the strength 
of the ASEAN scorecard in evaluating Corporate Governance of companies in practice. The reason for the bonus 
questions is to acknowledge organizations that exceed the fundamental in Level 1 by implementing good Corporate 
Governance practices. In contrast, penalty questions are meant to punish the companies with poor Corporate 
Governance practices that are not included in Level 1 scored categories, for example, getting sanctions for violating 
the listing rules. In details, Level 2 comprises of 12 bonus questions and 25 penalty questions and each category 
is given different total score. In penalty section, the score achieved will be then deducted from the total score 
gotten from Level 1 and Level 2. 
Lastly, the maximum score that can be achieved in total of 02 levels is 110 points and the minimum score is 
-10 points.  
 
3.3 Methodology specification  
Firstly, it is necessary to have a summary of all variables used in this paper: The variables are summarized as the 
following table below:  
Table 3. Descriptions of variables and expected effects of independent variables on dependent variables 
Variables Description Measurement Expected 
sign 
Dependent variables  
TOBINQ Tobin's Q ratio Tobin's Q = (Market Value of Firm)/(Book 
Value of Firm). 
 
ROA Return on assets ROA = Net income/Total Assets  
ROE Return on equity ROE = Net income/Total Equity  
Independent variables  
PA_SHAREHOLDERS  Positive 
PB_EQUITABILITY Equitable treatments of shareholders Positive 
PC_STAKEHOLDERS Roles of stakeholders   Positive 
PD_DISCLOSURE Disclosure and transparency  Positive 
PE_BOARD Responsibilities of the Board Positive 
TOTAL Total governance of 2 levels Positive 
Control variables  
LEVERAGE Leverage ratio Ratio of Total debt/total assets Positive 
SIZE Size of the firm log(assets) Positive 
Next, the study uses OLS to regress the association between Corporate Governance index and firm performance:  
π = β + β	TOTAL + βSIZE + βLEVERAGE + ε 
Reasons to separately test the influence of independent variable TOTAL on the firm performance:  
Total score of each company’s Corporate Governance is calculated by combining points from all other 
categories, which include: Part A: Shareholders’ rights, Part B: Equitable treatment of shareholders, Part C: Roles 
of stakeholders, Part D: Disclosure and transparency, Part E: Board duties and responsibilities, Bonus section and 
Penalty section.  It means that the variable TOTAL shares same information with other independent variables 
(PA_SHAREHOLDERS, PB_EQUITABILITY, PC_STAKEHOLDERS, PD_DISCLOSURE, PE_BOARD). ). 
Moreover, as stated in descriptive data section after, there exists high correlation (over 0.8) between TOTAL and 
other independent variables. Therefore, in order to avoid the problem of multi-collinearity, it is better to separately 
(2) 
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test the association of TOTAL on firm performance.     
Total score of Corporate Governance also includes the score calculated in Bonus and Penalty section. Because 
of the small weight of score in two sections, it is unnecessary to separate them into two more independent variables. 
Thus, it will be better if those sections included in TOTAL variable to test the overall significance of Corporate 
Governance Index on firm performance. 
Regression steps will be as follows: 
Step 1: Pooled Regression Model is run to examine how 06 regressors (PA_SHAREHOLDERS, 
PB_EQUITABILITY, PC_STAKEHOLDERS, PD_DISCLOSURE, PE_BOARD, TOTAL) influence the 
explained variables ROA, ROE, TOBINQ.  
Step 2: Error Testing 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
The following Table provide the Descriptive statistic of the Sample 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Sum Obs 
PA_SHAREHOLDERS 6.19 6.67 9.52 0.00 1.84 1114.29 180 
PB_EQUITABILITY 9.25 10 12 0.00 2.334763 1665 180 
PC_STAKEHOLDERS 3.90 3.85 8.46 0.00 1.67 702.31 180 
PD_DISCLOSURE 16.28 17.19 20.31 0.00 3.50 2931.25 180 
PE_BOARD 10.61 10.46 30.77 0.00 3.43 1909.54 180 
TOTAL 45.54 47.67 85.26 0.00 11.00 8197.29 180 
ROA 5.80 4.00 81.22 -12.12 9.86 1043.19 180 
ROE 12.75 11.33 131.64 -40.54 18.12 2294.95 180 
Q 1.25 0.95 9.04 0.20 1.30 211.83 169 
SIZE 14.27 14.06 18.09 10.08 1.50 2568.29 180 
LEVERAGE 28.78 27.60 70.40 0.00 20.59 5179.81 180 
All data relating to Corporate Governance Index, control variables and firm performance measures of 
Construction and Food & Beverage industry in 3 years (2015, 2017 and 2018) are summarized in the table 10. It 
can be seen that overall, the total score of Corporate Governance Index using ASEAN balanced scorecard of 60 
companies in two industries is about 45 points in average over a maximum attainable score of 110. Although it is 
not a high score compared to other countries’, the number has demonstrated the determination of Vietnam in 
improving Corporate Governance practices. According to the information collected by ACMF on 55 listed 
companies in Vietnam, the average total score of Vietnam Corporate Governance using ASEAN balanced 
scorecard was only 28.42 in 2012 and went to highest in 2015 with 36.75 points. However, after that, this number 
has gradually improved to over 45 points.  
Similarly, the scores for other categories such as shareholders’ rights, equitable treatments of shareholders, 
disclosure and transparency and board responsibilities have also demonstrated the positive improvement over the 
years. For example, the closure and transparency of information (PD_DISCLOSURE) have experienced a 
considerable change from just only 9.30 points in 2012 to 16.28 after that. Additionally, the average point for part 
C, Stakeholders’ roles, during three year-period is almost the same with the score achieved in 2012. It means that 
companies must reconsider the implementation of those corporate governance practices in this part for 
achievement of higher score in future.  
Besides, the mean figures of ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q are quite good as they are all positive number. 
Particularly, average Tobin’s Q is 1.25, which is higher than 1. This is a good sign to see as the companies generally 
do generate returns and have high market value. 
This section presents the results of six final regression models to demonstrates the quantitative correlation 
between the dependent variables (ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q) and six independent variables 
(PA_SHAREHOLDERS, PB_EQUITABILITY, PC_STAKEHOLDERS, PD_DISCLOSURE, PE_BOARD and 
TOTAL. The data is collected and calculated from two industries including 60 listed companies at time 2015, 2017 
and 2018.  
After conducting the POOL test, the significant independent variables are defined together with insignificant 
ones. The models with high R squared and variables not significant are removed. The equations are developed 
together and reduced to 6 final equation as follows  
Construction industry 
Estimate ROA = -7.25 - 1.79*PA_SHAREHOLDER + 2.44*PB_EQUITABILITY -
0.33*PC_STAKEHOLDERS - 0.61*PD_DISCLOSURE + 0.34*PE_BOARD + 0.56*SIZE + 
0.01*LEVERAGE 
Estimated ROE = -12.85 -3.06*PA_SHAREHOLDER – 0.52*PB_EQUITABILITY - 
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2.31*PC_STAKEHOLDERS -0.53*PD_DISCLOSURE + 0.32*PE_BOARD + 1.12*SIZE + 
0.08*LEVERAGE 
Estimate TOBINQ = -1.99 + 0.13*PA_SHAREHOLDER – 0.15*PB_EQUITABILITY + 
0.16*PC_STAKEHOLDERS + 0.005*PD_DISCLOSURE + 0.05*PE_BOARD + 0.21*SIZE – 
0.015*LEVERAGE 
Foods and Beverage Industry 
Estimate TOBINQ = -2.79 - 0.12*PA_SHAREHOLDER – 0.047*PB_EQUITABILITY + 
0.01*PC_STAKEHOLDERS - 0.003*PD_DISCLOSURE + 0.22*PE_BOARD + 0.24*SIZE – 
0.018*LEVERAGE 
All industries 
Estimated ROE = -9.88 -2.32*PA_SHAREHOLDER + 1.80*PB_EQUITABILITY + 
0.20*PC_STAKEHOLDERS – 0.19%PD_DISCLOSURE + 0.91*PE_BOARD + 0.87*SIZE + 
0.02*LEVERAGE 
Estimate TOBINQ = -2.55 + 0.01*PA_SHAREHOLDER – 0.09*PB_EQUITABILITY + 
0.08*PC_STAKEHOLDERS - 0.02*PD_DISCLOSURE + 0.18*PE_BOARD + 0.23*SIZE – 
0.017*LEVERAGE 
These equations for all industries can take example as follow: R-squared = 7.12% indicates that 7.12% 
variation in return on equity can be explained by variation of Rights of shareholders, Equitable treatments of 
Shareholder, Roles of stakeholders, Disclosure and transparency, Board duties and responsibilities, Size and 
Leverage. The value of R-squared implies a weak explanation for the fitness of data in the model. 
PA_SHAREHOLDERS, PB_EQUITABILITY, PC_STAKEHOLDERS, PD_DISCLOSURE, PE_BOARD 
are insignificant to ROA and ROE given 90% confidence level 
 
5. Conclusion & Discussion 
5.1 Discussion on the Corporate Governance score of companies in Vietnam using ASEAN balanced scorecard 
Rights of shareholders 
First, average points in three years for the category of “Shareholders’ rights” (PA_SHAREHOLDERS) of 
companies in Construction Industry is 6.21 points over the maximum points of 10 for this part. Overall, it means 
that the companies are doing the protection for shareholders quite well.  
Similar to Construction industry, companies in Food & Beverage industry gain the average point of 6.17 for 
“Rights of shareholders” category. Specially, there is a company in the industry that achieves an outstanding score 
for this part, which is Vinamilk. With the nearly perfect scores of 9.5, 8.6 and 9.0 in 2015, 2017 and 2018 
respectively, Vinamilk has shown the whole market a model of what the good corporate governance practices for 
shareholders are.  
Equitable treatment of shareholders 
The maximum score for equitable treatments of shareholder (PB_EQUITABILITY) in ASEAN scorecard is 15 
points, and the average score for this category of 30 companies in Construction industry for three-year time is 9.16, 
which is quite a good one.  
Expectedly, the average score for equitable treatments of shareholder (PB_EQUITABILITY) in ASEAN 
scorecard in Food & Beverage industry is not much different from Construction industry as the two scores are all 
around 9.3 over 15 points. Reason for the similarity in score is that Food & Beverage industry are also encountering 
the same issues with Construction industry.  
Roles of stakeholders 
In Construction industry, “Role of stakeholders” category average score is only 3.11 over the maximum attainable 
score for this part is 10 points. The maximum score of 6.15 points belongs to FLC Faros, which is a comparable 
low score. Reason for the low score in this part is mainly because Construction companies lack of evidence in 
demonstrating their responsibilities to society. In details, in 2015, there are 29 companies that did not have the 
separate section in annual report discussing their efforts on environmental and social issues. In 2017 and 2018, it 
seemed that Construction companies gradually notice and become more concerned about their responsibilities for 
community.  
Stakeholders’ right in Food & Beverage industry is also not clearly shown by companies so that the mean 
point for this section is quite low with 4.69 over 10 points. However, this point is still higher than Construction 
industry about 1 point. The reason for this difference is that Food & Beverage companies have better performance 
in showing their concerns toward environment and society. In 2018, there are only four companies that did not 
have separate section in annual report to discuss their efforts on environmental and social issues as well as promote 
sustainable development. Similar to the case of Construction industry, almost all Food & Beverage companies 
rarely disclose the policy of protecting employees from retaliation when informing unethical behaviors except for 
Vinamilk.  
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Disclosure and transparency 
That the constructed category includes 32 questions and accounts for 25% of the total score of Corporate 
Governance has demonstrated its importance of information transparency in Corporate Governance. Both industry 
gain the average score of about 16 points over 25 in “Transparency and disclosure”, which shows the attempt of 
companies to provide their stakeholders with as much information as possible.  
Due to the results of ASEAN balance scorecard, it is observable that there are some certain questions that 
constantly receive “No” answers. Those parts have somehow indicated the problems in “Disclosure and 
transparency” that Vietnam is struggling with. In details, firstly, companies do not completely inform shareholders 
about the name, relationship and value for each related party transactions. There are no information found in 60 
companies for this question. Moreover, about 26 Construction companies and 26 beverage companies do not 
disclose the direct and indirect shareholdings of substantial shareholders and 60 companies do not reveal the direct 
and indirect shareholdings of senior management. This may partly make investors and shareholders unable to 
accurately evaluate the value of the business in the present and in the future.  
Board duties and responsibilities 
There are 65 questions in this part accounting for 40% of total level 1 score. The weight of score assigned for this 
category shows the significance of board toward its company’s Corporate Governance.  
The mean score for Construction companies in this part is only 10.01 points, which is less than the maximum 
attainable score about 30 points. Though FLC Faros (2017) achieved highest score among 30 companies with 14 
points but it is still unexpectedly low. Higher than the average score of Construction industry about 1 point, Food 
& Beverage companies record the mean score for the whole industry with 11.26 points. Surprisingly, Vinamilk 
has done such an amazing performance when achieving the highest score among companies with 30.77 points in 
this part.  
Generally, companies often lose points to the questions relating to people on the board, audit committee, 
remuneration committee and nominating committee. As almost company, except for Vinamilk, do not establish 
different committee for audit, remuneration or nomination, 59 companies cannot give answers to those questions 
related. Therefore, for each company, 19 questions covering information about 03 committee are constantly 
marked with 0 point.  
5.2 Discussion on relationship between Corporate Governance Index and firm performance  
Firstly, in Construction industry, variable “Rights of shareholders” is statistically significant with 10 percent level 
of significance, displaying a negative effect with ROA. This result implies that when company does not allow 
shareholders to participate effectively in company’s decisions and limit their rights, company’s ROA will increase. 
Surprisingly, this finding is completely contrary to author's prediction when building the model. As in Food & 
Beverage industry, there is not enough evidence to conclude the impact of “Shareholders’ rights” on any firm 
performance measures given 90% confidence level.  
Secondly, in Construction industry, variable “Equitable treatments of shareholders” demonstrates its 
significant impact on ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q with 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Moreover, it is found that “Equitable treatments of shareholders” demonstrate its positive impacts on ROA and 
ROE, which completely coincides with the paper’s hypothesis and expectation. Meanwhile, the variable shows a 
negative correlation with Tobin’s Q, which is a market-based performance of the firm. The outcomes implies a 
opposite relation of Tobin’s Q to ROA, ROE, which reflects the difference in public market’s perception and 
reality of what firm is needed to generate returns.  
Thirdly, “Transparency and disclosure” surprisingly shows no impact on the performance of companies in 
both industries”, It was expected that the category might show some connection with the firm performance, at least 
with Tobin’s Q since it is a market-based measure. This result is contrary to the results discovered by Anjala & 
Shikha 2016 whose research topic was about the influence of Corporate Governance Disclosure Index on 38 non-
financial companies listed in National Stock Exchange of India for a five-year period from 2008-2012. Moreover, 
another conclusion might be withdrawn from the research result is that at a highly instable market like Vietnam, 
where authentication and fake are confusing, it requires higher point of transparency and information disclosure 
for companies to gain more investors’ trust to surrender funds for equity finance, which in turns strengthens the 
financial performance of the firms.  
Fourth, variable “Roles of stakeholders” shows no influence on any measures except for Tobin’s Q in 
Construction industry. It is statistically significant with 10 percent level of significance, displaying a positive effect 
with Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, the finding of “Roles of stakeholders” having no relationship with ROA is also found 
in research “Analyzing the impact of the Corporate Governance Index on the performance of listed companies 
VN30 Index” conducted by Dao & Nguyen (2018). Their Corporate Governance Index is similarly constructed 
based on OECD principles with 148 questions divided into 05 categories like ASEAN Corporate Governance 
balanced scorecard: Shareholders’ rights, Equitable treatment of Shareholders, Roles of stakeholders, Disclosure 
and Transparency, Board duties and responsibilities.   
Additionally, as can be observed from the result (P-value = 0.00005), “Board duties and responsibility” 
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demonstrates its positive influence on only Food & Beverage companies’ Tobin’s Q with 1% level of significance. 
In contrast, in Construction industry, it is insignificance to companies’ ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q given 90% 
confidence level. This finding is unexpectedly contrary to author’s expectation as the important role of a board 
within an organization is inevitable.  
Last but not least, although there have been different results of association between Corporate Governance 
practices and firm performance in both industries, the finding has discovered a similarity between them, which is 
the positive influence of total Corporate Governance score (TOTAL) on Tobin’s Q. Overall the average value of 
Tobin’s Q in Food & Beverage industry is 1.48, meaning that majority of firms sill have market value higher than 
book value. Meanwhile, this figure for Construction industry is just 1.02. With the similar average total scores of 
45.7 (Food & Beverage) and 45.38 (Construction), it can be seen that companies in Food & Beverage industry 
generates higher value of Tobin’s Q than that of Construction industry. In other words, total Corporate Governance 
Index affects companies in Food & Beverage industry more than those in Construction industries. For further 
implication, since Tobin’s Q is valued based on market expectation and sources of public information, it seems 
that people’ perception of transparency in Food & Beverage industry is much better than Construction one. It can 
also understand that people value the public information more in Food & Beverage sector since Food & Beverage 
deals directly with people’ health.  
 
5.3 Recommendation 
Overall, Vietnam needs to keep on improving the legal framework related to Corporate Governance practices in 
public companies in general and listed companies in particular. After the results of Corporate Governance Index 
using ASEAN balanced scorecard, there are some outstanding points that every lawmaker, business owner, investor 
need to pay attention to in order to get higher outcomes.  
To begin with, it is important to enhance guidelines on corporate responsibilities for stakeholders, especially 
for communities, society and the environment because stakeholders play significant roles in corporate businesses. 
The State needs to supplement regulations to guarantee fairness between major shareholders and small 
shareholders, between domestic shareholders and foreign ones. For instance, the information disclosure should be 
provided in two languages English and Vietnamese on listed company’s website. This will help to ensure the 
fairness for foreign shareholders and encourage the foreign investment flows at the same time.  
Moreover, it is necessary for Vietnam to learn the implementation of good Corporate Governance from other 
countries in region as they have many similarities with our countries in general. In this case, Thailand will be given 
as our example. From the reports published by ACMF in 2015, on the list of top 50 listed companies whose 
Corporate Governance scores are highest in Southeast Asian region, Thailand companies accounted for 23 spots 
over 50. In addition, the Institution of Directors was established is such a turning point for Thailand in the battle 
of improving Corporate Governance quality. They have had great merits in helping to develop professional 
directorial standards and giving great practice rules for organization chiefs. Learning from the success of Thailand, 
it is necessary that Vietnam should establish an organization dedicated to Corporate Governance. This organization 
will help stakeholders such as directors, executives, investors to raise awareness and knowledge about Corporate 
Governance as well to develop grading criteria based on international standards as well as the actual situation in 
Vietnam. Annual surveys can be carried out to assess aspects of Corporate Governance practices in Vietnamese 
listed companies. 
In summary, Corporate Governance is a significant issue for all of the nations in period of globalization and 
integration. Although Vietnam is starting with the initial period of Corporate Governance implementation, 
Vietnam needs to learn from countries that have been successful in executing Corporate Governance practices in 
order to have better performance outcomes.  
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